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Abstract 
A perusal of the criminal laws and personal laws reveal 
that laws adopt a protectionist and paternalistic approach 
for empowering and providing autonomy to women. This 
paper initiates a discussion on issues at the core of gender 
justice. It questions the man-woman dichotomy and 
asserts that if men and women are fundamentally 
different as categories, then a single yardstick for 
measuring justice is wrong. And, if they are not class wise 
different, and evince only personal traits, then the whole 
idea of gender justice based on the dichotomy is flawed. 
This paper further argues that social conditioning restricts 
the possibility of autonomous decisions. In conclusion, it 
is argued that laws need to create just social conditions 
and institutions that guarantee freedom from socially 
imposed disabilities, and subsequently, strengthen 
autonomy in decision making. 
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Introduction 
The state has adopted many measures in the form of laws and 
government schemes for women empowerment. Yet, many women 
                                                          








seem to be dissatisfied (Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, 
Government of India, 1974)i. In fact, many scholars opine that 
gender justice is still a mirage. This paper arises out of the need to 
reassess and explore the laws relating to women in India - to 
understand why women welfare measurements are not yielding 
fruits. Preliminary investigation reveals that the approach these 
laws adopt can be broadly classified as paternalistic that is, these 
laws dictate what is good for women. They are also protectionist as 
they extend the support of the state against attacks on a woman‘s 
person and property. We understand that these laws regard 
women as weak and vulnerable and hence adopt the protectionist 
and paternalistic approach. Several feminists have attacked this 
underlying assumption. They have argued for the lack of veracity 
of such claims and have often, through analysis, unravelled the role 
of social construction in creating such an ideology (Jaisingh, 2004).  
Through the following sections, this paper explores the laws 
relating to the protection of women and their empowerment. It 
investigates the rationale behind these laws as interpreted by the 
judiciary in various decisions. This paper draws from the 
arguments of feminists and evaluates them alongside Rawls‘ theory 
of justice (Rawls, 2005). Rawlsian theory justifies the extension of 
support of the law to the vulnerable, weak or to the disadvantaged 
group in order to bring them at par with the well-off group. 
Additionally, this paper employs a Kantian account of reasoning to 
scrutinise women empowerment laws to explain the social 
conditioning and the resultant impediment to ensuring women 
empowerment, women autonomy, and gender justice.  
Women empowerment and Indian laws 
Empowerment represents the granting of social, political or 
economic power to an individual or group. Women empowerment 
aims to provide women equal opportunities as well. It is the 
process of supporting women, to help them discover and provide 
them with the support to assert their personal power. The laws are 
enacted to empower women by granting them political power and 
by helping women achieve economic control and authority through 
education and social upliftment. Women empowerment is essential 
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for creating a stronger economy and achieving internationally 
agreed goals for sustainable development. Laws provide an 
essential foundation for fulfilling this purpose by creating a 
constructive environment for growth, and for facilitating women 
empowerment. An analysis of these laws can provide us a 
framework of how laws can be categorised. Within the purview of 
legal analysis, laws can be broadly classified as protectionist or 
paternalistic. The following paragraphs examine these approaches 
from a feminist perspective and explore how ideations within legal 
philosophy could provide us a conceptual framework to address 
these issues. 
a. Protectionist approach 
Criminal laws majorly fall under the purview of this category. The 
Indian Penal Code declares any form of interference with the body, 
dignity, honour and marriage, as an offenceii. The Indian Evidence 
Act makes presumptions in favour of women whereas the Criminal 
Procedure Code formulates safeguards in the interests of women, 
in cases of arrests. Additionally, a slew of statutes protect the 
interests of womeniii. 
In spite of all the protection that the law accords to women, justice 
is still distant. A closer analysis reveals the paternalistic contours. 
The provision relating to adulteryiv can be examined here. The 
courts have interpreted this section, to mean that the woman 
involved in the adulterous relation does not have any ‗voice‘ in this 
matter. This interpretation perhaps evokes the ‗property‘ valence of 
women, wherein, women as commodities can be exchanged and 
bartered as the property of their husbands. Hence, if a third person 
interferes with the property, here, the woman and wife, the law 
considers the husband, to be a victim and extends protection to 
him. The offense is against the husband, whose wife was being 
enticed away by a third person. A careful perusal of the provision 
also reveals that if the husband consents to the third party having 
sexual intercourse with his wife, then no offense is committed. Such 
a provision has been the matter of contention, with women 
vehemently opposing the provision of law (Jaisingh, 2004). The law 
caters to the ‗male‘ and his concerns. This provision apart from 
 




treating the woman as an object that belongs to a man also snatches 
away her autonomy. It ignores the fact that as a person she is 
capable of having and asserting viewpoints. 
Insensitivity towards women‘s rights can also be perceived in the 
decisions of the courts, wherein, in many verdicts, the court held 
that a woman of easy virtue cannot complaint of rapev, or that rape 
is just an outcome of an uncontrollable lust (AIR, Raju vs State of 
Karnataka, 1995), that a man experienced which was not in his 
control to restrain and hence, he should not be severely punished.  
Feminist theories maintain that law emerges from patriarchal 
mindsets to reinforce patriarchal values. The legal subordination of 
one sex to the other is wrong in itself, and one of the chief 
hindrances in human development (Mill, 1869). Laws speak of the 
male experience and portray male norms in the male voice while 
ignoring women‘s experiences and voices. Some features of the law 
may not only be non-neutral in the general sense but also ‗male‘ in 
the specific sense (Bartlett, 1990) and thereby contributing to 
women's oppression. Combined with this point about the effects of 
justice, is an equally cynical thesis about the language of ‗justice‘: 
namely that one important way in which the politically strong take 
advantage of the weak is by manipulatively attaching a self-serving 
sense to this powerful term (Barney, 2017). Callicles (Barney, 2017) 
argues that it is in the order of nature that the strong take 
advantage of the weakvi. Finley (1989) argues that even the 
language used by the law is male legal language, which plays a 
significant role in the way we comprehend the world around us. 
Since men have had an overpowering voice in making the laws, 
defining it and shaping it reflects significantly how they see the 
‗other‘. Even where they accommodate the ‗other‘, by making 
equality provisions in the laws, they do it in their own light and 
understanding and hence create a fundamentally flawed 
perspective as the basis of the laws (Finley, 1989), thereby creating 
the gendered nature of legal reasoning and language of the law.  
Addressing the issue of legislators‘ bias tiptoeing into law, John 
Rawls (Rawls, 2005) offers a suggestion. He suggests putting the 
lawmaker behind the ‗veil of ignorance.‘ In this ‗original position,‘ 
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he is ignorant of his standing in the society. He is accorded the 
knowledge about the society and the discriminatory practices 
therein and is required to choose principles of justice. In this 
original position, Rawls argues, that liberty that cannot be absolute 
and has to be restricted in the interest of liberties for the others 
(Rawls, 2005). The other principle of justice proposed by Rawls is 
equality based on the Minimax principle. As much as the whole 
idea is fictional or a mere thought experiment, nevertheless it 
highlights one important aspect. Social conditioning, biological 
conditioning or private interests should be segregated from 
lawmaking. This will ensure the provision of just laws that endorse 
liberty and equality.  
b. Paternalistic approach 
In the constitutional sphere, laws have adopted a paternalistic 
approach, using which they dictate what is good for women and 
ensuring that they get their share. Two main techniques for 
empowerment can be identified. One is women empowerment by 
way of affirmative action and the other is enabling autonomous 
decisions by reserving seats and putting women in decision-
making roles. There were only 15 women members as against 281 
male members in the Constituent Assembly. Two women 
members, Hansa Mehta and Rajkumari Amrit Kaur were a part of 
the sub-committee on Fundamental Rights. The most crucial 
purpose of this committee was to secure fundamental rights for 
men and women alike. The equality clause was a step towards 
achieving the same. Furthermore, the Constitution provided the 
equality of status and of opportunity for women in relation to men. 
Marriage, divorce, and inheritance are subject matters that are 
generally governed by a person's respective religion. It is guided by 
ritualised practices and is not based on rational argumentation. 
Within this purview, therefore, what the Constitution offered, it 
took away as well. It gave the right to equality but effectively 
diminished the same by granting the right to freedom of religion. 
Women faced major discrimination in the domain of the personal 
law. All the personal laws were dictated by religion. It thereby left 
laws relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and succession 
 




vulnerable to religious dictates. Hansa Mehta and Rajkumari Amrit 
Kaur were skeptical on the issue and suggested that the right to 
religion be confined to religious worship, but the constituent 
assembly blinded by social conditioning refused to accept the 
suggestive measure. It was widely accepted that personal laws are 
in the domain of religion and not a matter for secular legislation. 
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar observed that the British had also 
refrained from interfering in personal laws. Hence, substantive 
equality for women remained trapped in the patriarchal notions of 
the state. Later, the courts also refused to read personal laws as 
laws and held that they are not amenable to be judged by the 
touchstone of the right to equality provided by the Constitution of 
India. 
i. Affirmative action 
Additionally, the law ensured a protective discrimination in favour 
of women, to ameliorate their social, economic and political 
condition and to ensure social justice. Apart from the various laws 
enacted for the benefit of women, the Ministry of Women and 
Child Development has adopted many schemesvii for the 
empowerment, socio-economic development, and equality of 
women. Though the affirmative action is justified, as it helps in the 
development of women, yet the very idea rests on the belief that 
women are weak and require upliftment.  
In the domain of labour laws, women are still trapped under the 
pre-defined gender roles. An example of such a law is the Factories 
Act of 1948viii. It accommodates interests of women by providing 
for their welfare in the form of availability of crèches at the office. It 
overlooks that men might also be similarly in need of welfare 
measures. It is laudable that the laws are sensitive to the needs of 
women. But in doing so, the law endorses the patriarchal notion 
and dictates that women are to take care of children and men are 
absolved from such responsibility. It ignores the fact that men can 
be caring or that they may be burdened with a similar task of 
taking care of children. This facility of the crèche is not available for 
the male members working in the factory. Radical feminists raise 
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serious objections to this and argue that the root cause of women‘s 
oppression is in these pre-defined gender roles.  
These pre-defined gendered roles may have arisen out of the job 
allocation between male and female members of the society. Since 
women gave birth to children and had to nurture the child, they 
were more closely associated with nature. Her bodily processes 
identified her and characterised her as closely associated with 
nurturing and caring (Pattanaik, 2013)ix. Since women were more 
engaged in caring and nurturing the child, she was expected to stay 
back at home, attuned to her nature to the various activities 
centered on the home. Consequently, men had to be the providers. 
While women are expected to take care of kids and other members 
of the family including the male members and tend to their needs, 
men had a role of a hunter-gatherer who is expected to provide for 
the family. Eventually, men came to be considered strong, 
determined and aggressive as against the woman who was seen as 
humble, docile and physically weak.  
Job allocation may have arisen out of necessity, but eventually, it 
got crystallised and became endorsed by the cultural practices of 
the society. It was the most efficient, economic and a viable 
solution. It led to the optimal use of resources. Later, women like 
qualities were valued in women and male-like qualities were 
valued for men. This led to social conditioning and crytallising of 
gender-specific roles. Keeping the social roles intact was in the 
interest of the society and hence any deviation was reprimanded. 
Both the sexes were expected to fit in their respective defined 
zones. This only further augmented the strict identities, which 
came to be observed and perpetuated through generations. Failure 
to conform led to reprimanding and any deviation was viewed 
with contempt. 
Such gendered roles got embedded in the social institutions and 
structures. This could be seen through the presence of ―maternity 
leave‖ in most societies, while ―paternity leave‖ was still a rarity 
even among the most liberal of nations. What this highlights is the 
society‘s notions of gender roles are being reinforced by the 
systems of the society and perpetuated through it. Women 
 




experienced oppression in this power play in terms of male 
domination and women subordination. Feminists militate against 
patriarchy and male supremacy and argue that a significant 
overhauling of the societal mindsets was required to rectify this. 
They view laws as an endorsement of the age-old practice of 
oppression. They believe laws aren‘t really fair or provide equal 
treatment. Hence feminist legal theories are primarily aimed at 
―understanding and exploring the female experience, figuring out 
if law and institutions oppose females, and figuring out what 
changes can be committed to‖ (Claire, 1992). 
ii. Reservations in decision-making roles 
The paternalistic approach of the law also culminated into 
reserving seats for women in decision-making roles i.e. in 
municipalities and panchayats. The governing criterion was to 
ensure equality and to bring women at par with men, which the 
law simply assumed. This brings to mind another question. Should 
women be judged according to male standards? If yes, then can equality be 
achieved when women are brought on equal status with men? It was 
believed that since men are in decision-making roles, true equality 
could be achieved when women are also put in decision-making 
roles. This binary conception of justice demanded parity between 
members of the society as the true end of justice.  
It is contended that this is the fundamental flaw. The application of 
a binary conception of justice, to bring gender justice, fails as such 
an argument assumes 
1) that this society can be divided into two power opposites, 
i.e. men and women, 
2) that man is at the higher end of the power equation and 
women are at the lower end, thereby meaning men 
dominate the women,  
3) that the standard of judging the person at the lower end is 
the eyes of the person at the higher end of the power 
equation, and,  
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4) that gender justice can be achieved only by uplifting the 
person at the lower end up to the person at the higher end. 
This raises another issue - Is this Man-Woman dichotomy justified? 
Are men and women fundamentally different from each other?  
Studies (Watts, 1991) have persistently explained how men and 
women differ in their nature. They attribute individualistic, 
confident and aggressive attitudes to men while attributing 
passive, caring, and submissive attitudes to women. 
Radical feminists assert that the man-woman dichotomy exists in 
terms of male domination and woman subordination. This is the 
root cause of the contentions. On the other hand, cultural feminists 
are of the opinion that men and women have different 
characteristics and these characteristics should determine the role 
they play in the society. Cultural feminism, though originally 
evolved from radical feminism, departs from radical feminism in 
asserting that women are governed by the ethics of care. They 
would like the essence of being a woman preserved, as well as 
given due credit, regardless of whether this nurturing trait in the 
woman is biologically determined or socially conditioned. They 
assert that women give more importance to co-operation and value 
relationships and peace.  
Hence cultural feminists (Harding, 2004) conclude that women‘s 
actions should not be judged by the male standards. Instead, 
women be respected for the class of values that they represent. 
They should be put in such roles where these values find 
expression and enhancement. These values in the woman could be 
better utilised by placing her in leadership roles. They would allow 
them to secure all these values in the society thereby contributing 
to a better world. They speak of women being put into roles they 
are best suited to. 
Carroll Gilligan (1988) explains masculine voice as ‗logical and 
individualistic‘ and feminine voice as ‗caring‘. The masculine voice 
focuses on the justice elements and protection of rights whereas the 
feminine voice emphasises on interpersonal relationships and 
taking care of other people. The feminine voice focuses on the care 
 




perspective. She argued for the integration of the masculine and 
feminine traits for the realisation of the full potential of humans.  
Reverting to the questions at hand - if men and women are 
fundamentally different from each other then there can be no 
common yardstick for measuring equality. Men are different in 
their own domain, and women similarly are different in their own 
domain. Therefore, it is argued that bringing ‗unequals‘ at par with 
each other is not a real measure of equality. It is a fundamental 
principle of equality that categories being compared or evaluated in 
relation to one another be of commensurate nature and not 
contrasting. Essentially, men with their own characteristics of being 
individualistic and strong will grow in their own way whereas 
women, with their caring and nurturing traits, will grow in their 
own way. Trying to bring women at par with men would be a 
flawed attempt at ensuring equality. 
Perceived difference between male and female members - Effects 
of social conditioning 
It may be interesting to note the prevalence of matrilineal societies, 
in some parts of India. Most commonly known matrilineal societies 
are the Garo and Khasi tribesx of Meghalaya, a north-eastern state 
in India. These matrilineal societies experience the reverse kind of 
social conditioning. Women are considered to be strong and 
aggressive and the inheritance line is through the female members. 
Women are seen burdened with all sorts of roles and 
responsibilities. If women are weak as is the basic assumption in 
patriarchal societies, then decision-making roles for women is a 
misnomer. Or the reverse is true, that is, the women need to be 
considered a strong contender.  
Presence of matrilineal societies wherein women apply autonomy 
is an endorsement of the views of Simone De Beauvoir. That 
women are weak is a fact of social conditioning. It drives women to 
think of themselves as weak and handicapped. Hence, they tend to 
depend on their male counterparts. De Beauvoir asserted that 
women are capable of free choice. The constant reference to the 
woman as the ‗other‘ by the patriarchal society has had an adverse 
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impact on her autonomy. She feels women are capable of being 
responsible for themselves and the world around them. 
Stereotyping women as a ‗mystery that is un-understandable‘ 
helped men to shirk away from their responsibility. Hence, women 
have been looked upon as ‗female by virtue of a certain lack of 
qualities‘ (de Beauvoir, 1949). Alternatively, it has always been 
understood that men are the default setting whereas women were 
the recessive gender. She believed that one is not born as a woman 
but is made one. Women are taught to be caring and nurturing 
while men are taught to be individualistic. 
If Simone de Beauvoir‘s perspective is indeed true and following 
her, we assert that men and women are essentially no different as 
categories, that is, in class characteristics, but display specific 
characteristics of their individual selves irrespective of their sex, 
then the application of equality principles to bring women at par 
with men will reflect a flaw. Justice would be done when each 
individual has the opportunity and the freedom to grow in the way 
he wants.  
Hence, if it is agreed upon that men and women are fundamentally 
different from each other, then a common yardstick cannot be 
employed as a measure. And if men and women are no different 
from each other, then, the application of any yardstick as against 
the other is flawed. Thereby, it disrupts the background of legal 
philosophy underlying women empowerment laws, both 
protectionist or paternalistic.  
Law is a social fact and so are the societal dictates. The societal 
dictates that arise in the form of customs, laws or norms of conduct 
is a fact, accepted and followed as true, irrespective of what grants 
it, its validity. The dictates of culture regardless of the reasoning 
are accepted as binding without questioning. That acceptance 
stems from a habit, a behaviour long followed and imbibed, 
internalised by virtue of the habit and instilled by a habit practiced 
for long.  
Gender justice means that no one can be denied justice or 
discriminated based on one‘s gender (Singh, 2001). Laws, as seen 
above, are heavily tilted in favour of women. However, feminist 
 




philosophers would disagree that gender justice has been achieved, 
though laws were made in support of women - protecting them 
and empowering them. Much of the barriers lie in cultural norms 
embedded in the minds of people. Though it would be wrong to 
deny that there has been no improvement in the status of women in 
the society, it is not enough. The fundamental flaw is in the 
paternalistic and protectionist dimension of the law itself.  
Tracing the origins of women‘s subordination or the man-woman 
dichotomy may matter little when compared to tracing out the path 
to progress. For as much as a woman is caught up in gendered roles, so is 
a man. The historical blunder of stereotyping men and women has 
dwarfed the autonomous capacities of women and men alike. It is 
largely true that women have been at the receiving end of the 
subordination due to gendered roles, and would have benefited far 
more than men if that were not the case.  
In spite of laws standing for equality, substantive equality has not 
really been achieved. It retains its status in the formal spheres in the 
words of the law book. The realisation of autonomy, I argue, would 
result in real empowerment. 
Paternalism interferes with the autonomy of an individual. It snatches 
away the person‘s decision-making power and decides on his 
behalf. The paternal agent prevents harm and promotes good. 
Liberty is thereby curtailed. State paternalism in laws is very 
common. Particularly with respect to women, laws have been 
designed in a manner that treats women as a group that requires 
protection.  
Autonomy 
Legal measures, however, failed to provide autonomy for women. 
Autonomy means freedom to act and function independently, 
make informed and free decisions, without the involvement of 
another. Autonomous agents reason and make their own choices. 
They act on motives, reasons, and values that are their own.  
For Immanuel Kant (Johnson & Cureton, 2017), actions that are 
biologically determined or socially conditioned are not really free. 
Acting autonomously would be acting as per a law one assigns to 
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oneself. Kant discovered the supreme principle of practical reason. 
He called it the Categorical Imperative. It provides guidance for 
human behaviour. Kant asserts that we are intelligible beings 
capable of making autonomous decisions, even as against our 
natural inclinations, biological or social conditioning. Since each 
individual has this power of reasoning, each can exercise his/her 
reason and arrive at rational, autonomous choices. To determine 
whether the choices made are rational, Kant provides a formula. 
This involves acting only on a maxim that can be universalised. It 
also involves treating individuals as ends and not as means to an 
end. Kant believes that such rational thinking will lead us all to the 
same decisions. No conflict will arise as a result of it. Kant‘s 
account of reason and procedure of arriving at a right decision 
directs the person towards introspection. Kant assumes that 
everyone following similar principles will thereby arrive at the 
same decision. It warrants the question if such autonomous 
decisions would be mindful of social needs. Kant asserts that 
universalising the maxim would accommodate it. It is unclear as to 
why all would arrive at the same decision. Critics claim that to 
agree to such a theory would be irrational as they rest on principles 
of belief that not all could adopt (O‘Neill, 2001). 
True empowerment results in complete autonomy. If women were 
to be groomed as autonomous agents, they are to be allowed their 
own decision-making. The legal framework, therefore, should stop 
taking decisions on behalf of women. Ideally, the role of law then 
should get confined to creating social conditions that facilitate 
autonomous choices.  
But as seen earlier, laws are made by men. Men represent the 
patriarchal and paternalistic mindset. Even where there are ample 
laws in favour of women, women are still struggling for justice 
which is an evidence of the inadequacy of laws, in providing 
autonomy to women. If the malady lies in law-making, the 
correction of the process starts there.  
As discussed earlier, Rawls puts us through a thought process. 
Provided we achieve the feat of being able to put the legislator in 
the ‗original position‘, we would have made laws that are 
 




independent of patriarchal mindsets. But this thought process that 
puts a man in the ‗original position‘, accords to him a prior 
knowledge of the society. Autonomous agents in original position 
cannot really be said to be completely autonomous, as they have 
been given some knowledge of the society, including the problems 
therein. The moment he is accorded the knowledge that there is 
gender injustice in the society, he is compelled to use the law as a 
tool to reinforce equality.  
It is submitted that the very concept of ‗gender justice‘, involves the 
comparison between the two genders, thereby, assuming that a 
dichotomy exists. Any measures built around that assumption is 
fundamentally flawed. 
This results in treating men and women as two separate units and 
paternalistic laws, dictating how women should be empowered 
and what women should do to progress. Predominance of women 
in the legislature, would also not answer to the problem of securing 
autonomy. For as long as the legislators whether men or women 
are socially conditioned, they can‘t really be autonomous. 
Detaching the legislative mind from the social conditioning is the 
task. The fallouts of social conditioning are faced not only by 
women but also the men. Where the gendered roles require women 
to be caring and teach her self-abnegation, men are similarly 
burdened to be providers and are not accorded paternity leaves nor 
do they get the facility of a crèche, if they want to care for their 
children. So for laws to be truly just, they are to be made with a 
certain sense of objectivity.  
To the extent that the laws remove socially imposed disabilities, it 
could work well. It would facilitate the making of autonomous 
decisions. Feminist philosophers reject the Kantian and Rawlsian 
conception of autonomy, as the notion of the self, implicit in it is 
too atomistic or individualistic. They also raise doubts about - 
whether individualistic autonomy is a value that should be 
endorsed. But the Kantian account requires one to universalise the 
maxim arrived at and see whether it respects persons as ends in 
themselves. Rawlsian account of liberty is also not absolute or 
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individualistic. It restricts liberty in the interest of a like liberty for 
others. Hence the doubt, we argue, is ill-founded.  
On making autonomous choices 
Further, it is claimed that if it is accepted that women are 
biologically conditioned to be caring and by nature value social 
relationships, then the Kantian and Rawlsian account would deny 
women the advantages associated with ‗being autonomous‘. 
Autonomy and valuing relationships are seen as opposite ideas. 
Feminists typically look at autonomy from the women‘s 
standpoint. These arise wherein the woman makes excessive 
deference to others‘ wishes (self-abnegation) or makes adaptive 
preference formation keeping family interests in primacy, or adopts 
deformed desires or willingly adopts oppressive gender practices. 
Conflicting views prevail – that excessive deference is incompatible 
with autonomy, whereas if the woman is making a choice, she is 
nevertheless exercising autonomous choice when she willingly 
subverts her opinions and interests in favour of those of the others. 
It also might be the case that the woman is socially conditioned and 
raised to believe and assume subservient roles as a value. On 
making autonomous choices and forming standardised desires, 
women often tie their self-worth to extraneous factors like 
appearance or dressing. These standardised desires are the results 
of social conditioning and they damage both rational and 
autonomous choice.  
Kant would demand to examine the root cause of the decision. He 
would reject a decision if it is biologically or socially conditioned. 
As long as the decision serves another, he would reject it as being a 
heteronomous decision. True autonomy comes from moving out of 
inclinations and acting out of duty. So any act of self-abnegation 
based on inclination (acting out of love and affection) or out of 
social conditioning (observing socially induced values of sacrifice) 
fails to be autonomous. 
Can everyone be autonomous? Would it entail more friction in the 
society? That is where the role of reason comes into play. 
Autonomous decisions do not mean keeping one‘s interests ahead 
 




of others. Autonomy requires one to act as per a law one assigns to 
oneself, that agrees with the clause of universalisation and the 
clause of considering ‗others as ends‘. It requires one to act as per 
duty.  
Conclusion 
Furthering the above discussions into workable propositions is 
necessary. Legal philosophy needs to address the issues that are 
raised in the above discussions.  
Laws should first start with removing the constraints imposed on 
men and women by the society. It is necessary to tackle individual 
cases of injustices, instead of laying down homogenised rules for 
men and women. As depicted earlier, law reforms directed towards 
bringing women at par with men has not yielded much success. 
Individuals should be at the core of law reforms. Laws should 
enable the creation of social institutions and social conditions 
conducive for everyone to make autonomous choices. Raising the 
number of women members in parliament will help in reducing 
paternalistic laws and ensure autonomy to women in deciding for 
themselves. This will ensure women-friendly laws. 
Social engineering is required for the removal of social 
conditioning. Conscious measures need to be adopted to break free 
of social conditioning. Having gender neutral laws, promoting 
gender-neutral values and gender-neutral institutions will go a 
long way in getting rid of gendered roles for men and women alike.   
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